The PLO and PA Terror Payments Accountability Act of 2025 imposes sanctions on foreign individuals, entities, and financial institutions that support terrorism through the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) compensation systems.
Michael Lawler
Representative
NY-17
The PLO and PA Terror Payments Accountability Act of 2025 aims to hold the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) accountable for providing payments to terrorists and their families by mandating the President to impose sanctions on foreign individuals, entities, and financial institutions involved in facilitating these payments. These sanctions include blocking property, visa restrictions, and prohibiting U.S. bank accounts for foreign financial institutions. The Act will be terminated once the Secretary of State certifies that the PLO and PA have ceased these payments.
The "PLO and PA Terror Payments Accountability Act of 2025" aims to cut off the flow of money to terrorists and their families by hitting the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) where it hurts – their financial backers. This bill, enacted swiftly, sets up a system of sanctions targeting anyone involved in what it calls the "system of compensation" – payments made by the PLO and PA to individuals involved in acts of terrorism, and to the families of deceased terrorists.
This law isn't messing around. Within 90 days of becoming law, the President must impose sanctions on any foreign person or entity found to be supporting terrorism through the PLO/PA's compensation system. What does that mean in practice? It means freezing assets: any property these individuals or entities have within U.S. jurisdiction is blocked (Section 4(a)(1)(A)). It also means no entry into the U.S. – visas are denied or revoked (Section 4(a)(1)(B)). Think of it as a financial and travel lockdown for anyone caught supporting this compensation system.
For example, if a foreign charity is found to be knowingly channeling funds that end up as part of these PLO/PA payments, that charity's assets in the U.S. could be frozen, and its officials could be barred from entering the country. The law defines "knowingly" broadly, including not just those with actual knowledge, but also those who should have known (Section 3). This puts a lot of pressure on organizations to do their due diligence.
The bill also targets the financial institutions that handle these transactions. Within the same 90-day window, any foreign financial institution caught processing or facilitating payments related to the compensation system, or knowingly dealing with anyone sanctioned under Section 4(a), faces severe restrictions. They'll be cut off from the U.S. financial system, unable to open or maintain correspondent or payable-through accounts (Section 5). These accounts are crucial for international transactions, so this is a major blow.
Imagine a bank in a third country that knowingly processes a transfer from a sanctioned entity to the family of a terrorist. Under this law, that bank could lose its ability to do business with U.S. banks, effectively crippling its international operations. The definitions of "correspondent account" and "payable-through account" are taken from existing U.S. Code (Section 5), making the legal implications clear.
This law builds on the existing Taylor Force Act, which already aimed to restrict U.S. aid to the PA over these payments. The "PLO and PA Terror Payments Accountability Act" goes further, targeting foreign entities and financial institutions. The findings section (Section 2) directly links these payments to incentivizing terrorism, citing the horrific October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.
However, there are practical challenges. Proving that an entity "knowingly" supported the compensation system could be difficult in some cases. The broad definition of "terrorism" (Section 3), which incorporates definitions from the Immigration and Nationality Act, could also lead to disputes over who qualifies for sanctions. The law only ends when the Secretary of State certifies that the PLO and PA have stopped these payments (Section 6) – a determination that could become highly politicized.
Ultimately, this bill represents a significant escalation in the U.S. effort to combat terrorism financing, but its effectiveness will depend on how aggressively and consistently it's enforced, and how carefully the broad definitions are applied.