The No Rogue Rulings Act of 2025 severely limits federal district courts from issuing injunctions that affect non-parties, with an exception for multi-state lawsuits against the executive branch heard by a randomly selected three-judge panel.
Darrell Issa
Representative
CA-48
The No Rogue Rulings Act of 2025 significantly restricts federal district courts from issuing injunctions that affect parties not directly involved in a lawsuit. An exception allows a specially convened, randomly selected three-judge panel to issue broad injunctions in multi-state lawsuits against the executive branch. Decisions made by this panel regarding injunctions can be appealed directly to the Supreme Court or the relevant circuit court at the losing party's discretion.
| Party | Total Votes | Yes | No | Did Not Vote |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Democrat | 213 | 0 | 212 | 1 |
Republican | 220 | 219 | 1 | 0 |
The “No Rogue Rulings Act of 2025,” or NORRA, is a piece of legislation that dramatically changes how federal district courts can issue injunctions—those court orders telling the government or another party to stop doing something. The core of NORRA is simple: it generally prohibits a single federal judge from issuing any injunction that affects people who aren't directly involved in the lawsuit. This means if a new federal policy is causing problems for millions of people, a court could only stop that policy for the specific plaintiffs who sued, not for everyone else. This limitation, found in Section 2, overrides nearly all existing laws that might allow for broader relief.
Think about a major federal rule change—say, a new environmental regulation that suddenly allows a factory to pollute a river, or a major shift in student loan forgiveness policy. Currently, if a group of people sues the government over that policy and wins an injunction, that court order often applies nationwide, halting the policy for everyone until the case is resolved. Under NORRA, that changes instantly. If a policy is challenged, the court can only grant relief to the specific individuals or groups who filed the lawsuit. For the general public, this means that even if a judge agrees the executive action is illegal, the harmful policy continues to affect everyone else—your neighbor, your co-worker, and your family—until the case somehow makes it up to a higher court, potentially years later. This essentially shields executive actions from immediate, broad judicial pushback.
NORRA does carve out one major exception, and it's a procedural game-changer. If two or more states, located in different federal circuits, decide to sue the executive branch over an action, that case gets special treatment. It bypasses the single district judge and must be heard by a special three-judge panel, chosen randomly (not just by the chief judge). This panel can issue a broad, nationwide injunction, but only after applying heightened scrutiny. They have to carefully weigh factors like fairness, the risk of irreversible harm to non-parties, and whether they are overstepping constitutional boundaries (Section 2).
Perhaps the most unusual part of this bill is what happens after that three-judge panel makes its decision. If the government or the states lose the case before this panel, the losing party gets an unprecedented choice regarding their appeal. They can choose to appeal the decision to the regular federal circuit court that covers the district where the case was heard, or they can bypass the Circuit Court entirely and appeal directly to the Supreme Court. This gives the losing side a massive strategic advantage, allowing them to essentially forum-shop for the fastest or most favorable appellate venue. This new power could significantly alter the standard, established flow of the federal appellate process, especially in high-stakes legal battles between states and the federal government.