PolicyBrief
H.R. 1215
119th CongressFeb 11th 2025
Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025
IN COMMITTEE

The "Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025" aims to diversify and secure the semiconductor supply chain within the Western Hemisphere through diplomatic support, regulatory improvements, and strategic investments, bolstering both economic and national security.

Greg Stanton
D

Greg Stanton

Representative

AZ-4

LEGISLATION

New Bill Aims to Boost Semiconductor Supply Chain Diversity in Western Hemisphere, Could Ease Reliance on Single Sources

The "Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025" is all about making sure the U.S. and its neighbors aren't relying on just one or two places for the guts of our tech – semiconductors. This bill focuses on spreading out the supply chain across the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Latin America. Think of it like this: instead of all our eggs in one basket, we're distributing them across multiple, friendly baskets closer to home.

Spreading the Semiconductor Love (and Investment)

The core idea is to diversify where semiconductors and their components come from. The bill specifically talks about both upstream (mining and processing raw materials like lithium and cobalt – Sec. 2) and downstream (testing and packaging the chips – Sec. 2) supply chains. It encourages U.S. investment in Latin American semiconductor projects (Sec. 3), with the goal of creating a more resilient and secure supply chain for the entire region. For example, a U.S. tech company could invest in a new chip packaging facility in Mexico, creating jobs there and reducing reliance on facilities in, say, a single Asian country. Or, a mining operation in Chile could receive funding to improve its lithium extraction processes, providing a more stable supply of this critical material for U.S. battery and chip manufacturers.

Smoothing the Path (and Bending Some Rules)

The bill isn't just about wishing for a better supply chain; it's about actively supporting it. It directs the U.S. government to offer diplomatic support to Western Hemisphere countries, help improve their regulatory environments for semiconductor businesses, and promote market integration across the region (Sec. 4). It is also the policy of the United States to promote the security of its allies and partners by fostering accessible, transparent, competitive semiconductor markets that offer varied sources, types, and parts of semiconductor chips. (Sec. 3).

Here's where it gets interesting: The bill allows the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to support projects in wealthier Latin American countries (upper-middle-income or high-income) that usually face stricter funding rules (Sec. 4). But, there's a catch. The President has to certify that any such support either significantly helps development or counters the influence of "strategic competitors" (think China) trying to gain leverage in the region (Sec. 4). This means that a project in, say, Brazil, which might not normally qualify for DFC support, could get the green light if it's deemed crucial for U.S. economic or security interests.

The Big Picture

This bill is a direct response to the global chip shortages and supply chain vulnerabilities that have been causing headaches for everyone from car manufacturers to smartphone makers. By diversifying the semiconductor supply chain and bringing more of it closer to home, the U.S. aims to reduce its reliance on potentially unstable or adversarial sources. It's also about strengthening economic ties with Latin American countries and, let's be real, countering China's growing influence in the region. The challenge, of course, will be ensuring that these investments truly benefit the host countries and don't just become a way for U.S. companies to bypass normal funding restrictions or gain an unfair advantage.