This bill restricts the State Department from using buildings for embassies or consulates that were built or are owned by entities controlled by the Chinese government.
Cory Mills
Representative
FL-7
The "Embassy Construction Integrity Act of 2025" restricts the State Department from acquiring or leasing buildings for diplomatic posts abroad if a Chinese government-controlled entity was involved in its construction or has an ownership stake. It also restricts agreements with these entities for construction work on such buildings. The Secretary of State must notify Congress of any exceptions made in the interest of national security, along with justifications and risk mitigation plans.
New Embassy Construction Bill Bans Chinese-Built Diplomatic Posts: Security Measures Take Effect Immediately
The Embassy Construction Integrity Act of 2025 is all about keeping U.S. diplomatic and consular buildings out of the hands of entities controlled by the Chinese government. Basically, if a company with significant ties to the Chinese government built, worked on, or owns a building, the U.S. State Department can't buy it, lease it, or even hire them for construction, starting retroactively from January 1, 1949 (SEC. 2).
Building Barriers
The core of this law is a strict "no-go" policy. It outright prohibits the Secretary of State from acquiring or leasing any buildings for diplomatic use if a "covered entity"—essentially any company under substantial Chinese government control—has had anything to do with its construction since 1949, or if the entity has any ownership stake. "Covered construction" isn't just about putting up walls; it includes installing or maintaining building systems like HVAC, electrical, and plumbing (SEC. 2). Think of it like this: If a Chinese-government-linked company laid the pipes or wired the building, it's off-limits for U.S. diplomatic use.
Real-World Radar
Imagine the U.S. needs a new consulate in a rapidly growing city. This law means the State Department can't just lease space in a brand-new skyscraper built by a Chinese-backed firm. They'd have to find an older building (built before 1949), one that's never had any major work done by such a firm, or build something entirely new, avoiding those "covered entities." This could be a headache in places where Chinese companies are major players in construction and real estate.
Exceptions and Espionage
There's a national security loophole, but it comes with strings attached. If using such a building is deemed absolutely vital to U.S. national security, the Secretary of State can bypass the restrictions. However, they must notify Congress within 7 days (before or after the fact) and explain why it's necessary, what the security risks are, and how they plan to mitigate those risks (SEC. 2). This clause is important because it provides some flexibility while also ensuring transparency and accountability.
The Bottom Line
This act is designed to prevent potential espionage or security breaches within U.S. diplomatic facilities. The big challenge? The definition of "significantly owned or controlled" (SEC. 2) could be tricky to nail down in practice. It also potentially limits the State Department's options in areas where Chinese-linked construction companies are prevalent, potentially slowing down the process of setting up or maintaining diplomatic posts. While the goal is clear—enhanced security—the practical impact on diplomatic operations could be significant, especially in regions with a heavy presence of Chinese construction and development.