This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment requiring the federal government to achieve a balanced budget over a ten-year period, with exceptions for emergencies approved by a two-thirds vote in Congress.
Nathaniel Moran
Representative
TX-1
This joint resolution proposes a constitutional amendment requiring the federal government to balance its budget over time, meaning spending must generally match receipts, excluding borrowing. Congress would have ten years after ratification to achieve this balance. The amendment allows for exceptions during declared emergencies, provided a two-thirds majority in both chambers approves the extra spending.
This joint resolution proposes adding a new constitutional amendment that would force the federal government to balance its budget over a ten-year rolling period. Essentially, Uncle Sam would have a decade to make sure that the money coming in (receipts, minus borrowing) equals the money going out (spending, minus paying off old debt). It’s a massive fiscal shift, giving Congress ten years after ratification to figure out how to make the numbers work.
Think of this as putting the entire federal government on a decade-long financial diet. The core idea is fiscal discipline: stop spending more than we earn. For the average person juggling a mortgage and rising grocery bills, the appeal of a government that lives within its means is obvious. However, achieving this balance means Congress will have to make tough choices, likely leading to significant cuts in discretionary spending—the kind of money that funds everything from national parks to federal research grants. If you rely on a federal program, or work for an agency that depends on annual appropriations, those budgets could be facing serious austerity measures.
The amendment does include an escape hatch for true crises, like a major war or a catastrophic economic collapse. If a genuine emergency hits, Congress can authorize deficit spending, meaning they can spend more than they take in. But here’s the catch: they need a two-thirds majority in both the House and the Senate to do it. That’s a huge hurdle. For context, getting two-thirds of Congress to agree on what to order for lunch is often a struggle. This supermajority requirement, while designed to prevent frivolous spending, could effectively slow down or even paralyze the government’s ability to respond quickly and robustly to genuine national emergencies or severe economic downturns. Imagine a sudden recession where stimulus spending is needed—getting 67 senators and 290 representatives on board fast could be nearly impossible.
If Congress does invoke the emergency clause and rack up debt, the amendment requires that this debt be paid back “as quickly as possible” once the crisis is over. This sounds responsible, but the language is vague. What exactly does “as quickly as possible” mean? Is it two years, five years, or twenty? This lack of objective metrics could be a major loophole. Politicians could easily argue that economic conditions prevent rapid repayment, deferring the hard choices indefinitely. This vagueness could lead to ongoing political battles over repayment schedules, leaving the actual burden of that emergency debt hanging over the next generation of taxpayers.
While the amendment aims to curb the national debt, the practical impact is a significant loss of flexibility. During an economic slump, governments often increase spending (Keynesian policy) to stimulate demand and get people back to work. This amendment would make that counter-cyclical spending extremely difficult without the supermajority sign-off. For the person who loses their job during a recession, the inability of the government to quickly fund unemployment benefits or infrastructure projects could prolong the downturn. This proposal forces a long-term commitment to fiscal stability, but it comes at the potential cost of hamstringing the government’s immediate ability to act when the economy—or the country—needs it most.